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Redistribution schemes (taxes or beneﬁts) are generally performed at the household level.
The issue is to know whether intra-household inequality magniﬁes or hampers the redistributive
eﬀect of the transfers, when the policy-maker focuses on the inequality at the individual level.
Depending on the type of the transfer, three properties capturing the idea that the more wealthy
the household is, the more unequally it behaves, have been shown to matter. In the moving
away approach, the deviation with the equal split make a diﬀerence, in the star-shaped approach,
the average share counts while the marginal share is relevant for concavity. We complete the
analysis by showing how these properties of the intra-household allocation may be recovered
through a bargaining model of the household. Then, the DARA and DRRA properties of the
utility function emerge as the key conditions for the recovery.
J.E.L. Codes: D10, D31, D63, H24. Key-words: Inequality, Intra-household Allocation,
Household bargaining, Lorenz curve, Taxation schemes.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Whenever the (relative) Lorenz criterion is adopted for inequality comparisons, a progressive tax
schedule guarantees that the post-tax income distribution is at least as egalitarian as any initial
income distribution (Jacobsson [7]). This inequality-reducing property of income tax systems
has been deeply analyzed in the literature (see for instance, Eichhorn et al. [5], Le Breton et
al. [9]). Nevertheless, its ultimate eﬀect is still unknown, when we deal with inequality among
individuals. In fact, taxation is usually performed at the level of households, despite the fact
hat discrimination in the resources allocation (e.g. money or leisure time) within household
members is present in many societies (Sen [16], Haddad and Kanbur [6], Anand and Sen [1]).
The important question which then arises is whether intra-household inequality magniﬁes or
hampers the redistributive eﬀect of taxation, when the policy-maker focuses on inequality at the
individual level.
In this paper we retain the setup of Peluso and Trannoy ([12]), considering a population
of couples where each household contains a dominant individual and a dominated one. The
dominant receives more than one half of the family budget while the dominated receives less
than one half. In the ﬁrst part of the paper, the intra-household allocation is described through a
sharing function which can be considered as a reduced form of a structural model of the allocation
among family members. The sharing function gives the income received by the dominated
type as a function of the household income: To study the properties of the sharing function
is tantamount to analyze the way intra-household inequality is related to household income.
We analyze the eﬀectiveness of redistributive policies designed at the household level on the
inequality among individuals. Our results illustrate that when the domain of redistributive
policy schemes shrinks, the class of sharing functions which keep the inequality-reducing eﬀect
of progressive taxation becomes larger. We ﬁrst show that concavity of the sharing functions
is both necessary and suﬃcient to extend the eﬀects of any inequality-reducing redistributive
scheme among couples to the individual level. Since empirical evidence are far from conﬁrming
3that a strong property as the global concavity of sharing functions is really satisﬁed (see Kanbur
and Haddad [8], Couprie et al. [3]), we proceed by looking for redistributive policies which
are inequality-reducing for individuals, under less demanding conditions on the curvature of the
sharing function . By focusing on some important cases such as a poll-tax and a ﬂat tax,w h i c h
are "neutral" − in the sense that they do not aﬀect inequality among households when Absolute
(respectively Relative) Lorenz criterion are used for inequality comparisons) − some clear-cut
results may be established. Indeed, these basic taxation schemes reduce the inequality at the
level of individuals for classes of sharing functions larger than the concave one: respectively
the moving away class, (for which the deviation of individual expenditures with the equal split
increases) and the star-shaped class (where the average share received by the dominated type
is non-decreasing). These results are consistent with the general intuition that the pattern of
individual inequality is the same as that of household inequality, when the poorer the household
is, the more egalitarian it behaves. The purpose of the second part of the paper is to recover
such classes of sharing functions starting from the primitives of one of the canonical model of
family decision making. By considering a symmetric Nash bargaining model between the two
spouses, it is shown that the shapes of the sharing function mentioned above are induced by
some well-known properties of the individual utility functions under risk, as DARA (decreasing
absolute risk aversion) and DRRA (decreasing relative risk aversion).
2B a s i c c o n c e p t s
We consider a population composed of n households indexed by i =1 ,...,n,with n ≥ 2. Let y be
a generic vector of strictly positive household incomes, ordered in an increasing way. The feasible
set of y is Yn =
©
y ∈Rn
+ |a ≤ y1 ≤ y2... ≤ yn,f o rs o m ea>0
ª
. The unit vector in Rn
+ is denoted
en. The quasi-orders we consider for inequality comparisons are the Lorenz (L) criterion, the
Relative Lorenz (RL) and the Absolute Lorenz test (AL). For the sake of completeness, we recall
the deﬁnitions.
4Deﬁnition 1 Given y,y0∈Yn,
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i − µy0), for k =1 ,..,n.
We adopt a very comprehensive deﬁnition of redistributive taxation schemes, borrowing some
concepts from Le Breton et al. (1996).
Deﬁnition 2 A redistributive scheme is a mapping G : R+ → R+,that associate a post-redistribution
income G(y) to the pre-redistribution income y.
Let G be the general set of redistribution schemes deﬁned on R+.
A reasonable property of a redistributive scheme is that it does not aﬀect the ranking of
individuals in the pre-tax income distribution (see Le Breton et al. [9] for a discussion). Usually,
we also impose a notion of consistency, excluding the case of redistribution of some external
wealth. We give more formal deﬁnitions of these concepts.
Deﬁnition 3 A redistributive scheme G ∈ G is
- rank-preserving if G is non-decreasing over R+.




yi, for any y ∈Yn
- progressive if G(y)/y is non-decreasing over R++
Let us call G∗ the set of rank-preserving, consistent and progressive redistributive schemes
on R++. In general, a redistribution scheme can be the result of many diﬀerent policies. Among
the redistributive schemes, some present salient properties.
5Deﬁnition 4 A redistributive scheme G ∈ G is
- a taxation scheme if G(y) ≤ y, for any y ≥ 0
-ab e n e ﬁts c h e m ei fG(y) ≥ y, for any y ≥ 0.
-l i n e a ri fG(y)=( 1− t)y + q, for t ∈ [0,1].
We will consider some important cases of linear taxation: if q =0 , then G is a ﬂat tax.I f
t =0 ,w h e nq<0 we have a poll tax,w h e nq>0 a basic income.
2.1 Sharing Functions
We follow here the setup of Peluso and Trannoy [12]. Without loss of generality, we consider
a population of couples and we suppose that each household is composed of two equally needy
individuals. In spite of their equal need, the intra-household allocation is unequal. A dominated
individual, receives at most an income share equal to the share received by the dominant one.
Thus dominant individuals are the ‘rich’ within the household and the dominated are the ‘poor’.
Let pi = fi
p(yi), be the amount received by the dominated individual in household i.T h ea m o u n t
ri received by the dominant is deﬁned by ri = yi − fi
p(yi).
Given a vector y of household incomes, p(y)= ( p1,..,p j,..,p n) designates the income vector
for dominated individuals, r(y)= ( r1,...,r j,...,r n) the income vector for dominant individuals,
and x(y)=( p(y),r(y)).
The sharing functions fi
p are the same among households, that is, a common bias due to a
social norm induces a homogeneous intra-household discrimination in the population considered.
Assumption 1 The functions fi




Let us designate by F the set composed of sharing functions satisfying Assumption 1 above.
A ﬁrst remark conﬁrms the rather obvious intuition that a lower intra-household discrimination
implies a more equally income distribution among individuals.
6Remark 1 Let fp and f0
p ∈ F.
fp(y) ≥ f0
p(y) ∀y ∈ R+ ⇐⇒ x(y) <L x0(y) for all y ∈ Yn.
Proof. =⇒ If we compare the individual incomes generated by the diﬀerent sharing functions
fp and f0
p for the household i, then the second distribution can be deduced from the ﬁrst one




Moreover, given that (1) holds for every household, applying Proposition A.7 (i), p. 121 of
Marshall-Olkin [10], we obtain x(y) <L x0(y).
⇐= Suppose by contradiction f0
p(a) >f p(a) for some a>0. By considering the distribution
y =(a,...,a), it is easy to see that x(y) may be obtained from x0(y) through some regressive
transfers and then x(y) <L x0(y) is false.
There are two ways to capture the idea that the situation of the dominated weakens when
the household income increases: we may think either in relative or in absolute terms.
To catch the relative point of view, let us deﬁne S∞ as the subset of F of star-shaped at +∞
sharing functions, composed of functions satisfying: fp(αy) ≥ αfp(y), ∀α ∈ [0,1] and ∀y ∈ R+.
Within this class, the income share of the dominated is decreasing with household wealth, i.e.
fp(y)
y
decreases with y for y>0.
The opposite case, fp(αy) ≤ αfp(y), ∀α ∈ [0,1] and ∀y ∈ R+ describes star-shaped at 0
sharing functions.
In order to apprehend the absolute point of view, we introduce the class MA ⊂ F,c o m p o s e d
of moving away functions. Namely, ∀a,b ∈ R+ with a<b ,f p(b) − fp(a) ≤
b − a
2
. In order to
give an interpretation of this class, let us consider the deviation between the equal split income
and the amount devoted to the ‘poor guy’,
y
2
−fp(y)=ψ(y). Requiring ψ to be non-decreasing
is tantamount to restrict its attention to the MA class.
A moving closer sharing function goes on the opposite way. The division of the family cake
is moving closer to the equal split as the household income increases along.
7A result of this paper is related to a third set C ⊂ F composed of concave functions. The
functions of C are continuous and non-decreasing (see Moyes [11], Lemma 3.2). On the opposite,
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fp  MA 
 fp 
y
Figure 1: The classes of sharing functions
It is well established that C is a subset of S∞ (see Marshall and Olkin [10] p. 453). We prove
the following remark:
Remark 2 S∞⊂ MA.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that fp does not belong to MA. Then, for some a,b ∈ R++,
with a<b ,we get fp(b) − fp(a) >
b − a
2
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2 −
fp(a)
a ) are non-negative by Assumption 1. If they are both positive,














a =0 , from (2) we get b




fp ∈ S∞, then 1
2 −
fp(a)
a =0and (2) gives 0 < 0.
83 Redistributive schemes and inequality among individuals
In this section, we investigate the main eﬀects of redistributive policies performed at the house-
hold level on the individual inequality. The properties of the sharing function play a decisive role.
The following proposition establishes that a concave sharing rule extends the inequality-reducing
properties of a progressive scheme to the individual level .
Proposition 1 Let fp ∈ F.
fp ∈ C ⇐⇒ ∀ y ∈Yn, ∀G∈G∗, x(G(y)) <RL x(y).
Proof. =⇒ A direct consequence of Corollary 1 in Peluso and Trannoy [12] and Proposition
3 . 1i nL eB r e t o ne ta l .[ 9 ] .
⇐= Assume by contradiction that fp is not concave. From a Yaari’s lemma (see [17], Lemma
p.1184) it follows that for some y∗ ∈ R++, there exists ζ>0 such that, for any ε with 0 <ε<ζ
2fp (y∗) <f p(y∗ − ε)+fp(y∗ + ε). (3)
Furthermore, (3) combined with fp(y∗) ≤ 1
2y∗ implies fp(y∗) − fr(y∗) < 0.1 Then, by
continuity, there exists ¯ ζ>0 such that, for every ε satisfying 0 <ε<¯ ζ, (3) holds and
fp(y∗ + ε) <f r(y∗ − ε).( 4 )
We now choose y =(y1,..,y n−2,y ∗,y∗) and y0=(y1,..,yn−2,y ∗ −ε,y∗ +ε), such that fr(yn−2) ≤
fp(y∗ − ε). By construction, y <RL y0. From (3), we deduce fp (yn−1)+fp (yn) <f p( y0
n−1)+
fp(y0
n) which gives, combined with (4), 1
nµ
P2n−2




j. Hence, x(y) <RL x(y0) is
contradicted.
A policy maker can ignore intra-household inequality when designing a redistribution scheme
at the household stage if and only if the sharing function is concave. The rationale behind this
result may be captured from the proof above: without a concave sharing function, the beneﬁt
received by a poor household further to a transfer from a richer household may increase the
1Indeed, by assumption fp(y
∗) ≤ fr(y
∗). Suppose now that fp(y
∗)−fr(y




∗. From (3) and fp(y) ≤
1
2y ∀y,w eg e ty
∗ <f p(y
∗ − ε)+fp(y
∗ + ε) ≤ y
∗, which is impossible.
9inequality among individuals. Less restrictive results may be obtained whenever we focus on
taxation schemes, excluding the possibility of beneﬁts. In the following proposition, we show
that, under sharing functions star-shaped at ∞,aﬂat-tax at the household level reduces the
inequality among individuals.
Proposition 2 Let fp ∈ F
fp ∈ S∞ ⇐⇒ [x(αy)<RLx(y),∀α ∈ [0,1] and ∀y ∈ Yn].
Proof. =⇒ By assumption fp(αy) ≥ αfp(y), ∀α ∈ [0,1] and ∀y ≥ 0.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t f o r
every household i
(fp(αyi),f r(αyi))<GL (αfp(yi),α f r(yi)). (5)
Since (5) holds for any household i, by applying Proposition A.7 (iii), p. 121 of Marshall-
Olkin [10], we obtain x(αy)<GLαx(y). Dividing both vectors by α
µy











⇐= Suppose that fp / ∈ S∞. Then ∃α ∈ (0,1) and ∃y∗ > 0, such that: fp(αy∗) <α f p(y∗).
By picking y =( y∗,..,y∗) and y0 = αy, we have y0 <RL y by construction and µy =
µy0













j. Hence x(αy)<RLx(y) does not hold.
In particular, it may be observed that the inequality among individuals is strictly reduced
for all non-linear fp ∈ S∞. This result has a double interest. On the one hand, unexpectedly, it
aﬃrms that a policy-maker may strictly mitigate the inequality at the level of individuals even
avoiding a progressive taxation of households (a ﬂat tax does not modify the inequality among
households). On the other hand, the key-condition about intra-household allocation, that is, a
sharing function star-shaped at ∞, appears more plausible than concavity, at least according to
the ﬁrst empirical analysis in this direction (Couprie et al. [3]).
In a similar way, it is possible to show that a beneﬁt scheme, which increases household
incomes in the same proportion, reduces the inequality among individuals in relative terms
whenever the sharing function is star-shaped at 0. Corresponding results emerge whenever
absolute diﬀerences count for the appraisal of inequality. The next proposition emphasizes the
10interest of a poll-tax, which leaves unchanged the inequality among households (according to the
AL criterion) but reduces the inequality among individuals under the large class of the moving
away sharing functions. We assume that the poll-tax may be paid by all households, that is
t<a .
Proposition 3 Let fp ∈ F.
fp ∈ MA ⇐⇒ [x(y−ten)<ALx(y),∀y ∈ Yn and ∀t<a ]
Proof. =⇒ Since fp ∈ MA,t h e nfp(yi) − fp(yi − t) ≤ t
2, ∀t>0, which may be rewritten as
fp(yi) −
µy
2 ≤ fp(yi − t) −
µy−ten
2 . We get, for any household i,
³
fp(yi − t) −
µy−ten













Let ˇ x(y) designate the centered vector of individual incomes. Then, we can deduce from (6)
that ˇ x(yi − t)<L ˇ x(yi) for any i. Proposition A.7 (i), p. 121 of Marshall and Olkin [10], gives
ˇ x(y−ten) <L ˇ x(y),t h a ti sx(y−ten) <AL x(y).
⇐= Suppose that fp / ∈ MA. Then, ∃t>0 and ∃y∗ > 0, such that: fp(y∗) −
y∗
2 >f p(y∗ −
t)−
y∗−t
2 . Let us consider y =( y∗,..,y∗,y∗) and y0 = y−ten. By construction µy0 = µy −α and
y0 <AL y.S i n c efp(y∗) −
ny∗








consequently x(y0)<ALx(y) does not hold.
B yt h es a m et o k e n ,i tm a yb es h o w nt h a tab a s i ci ncome reduces the inequality in absolute
terms whenever the sharing function is of the moving closer type.
4 Recovering sharing functions through a bargaining model
The sharing functions are an intermediate product of the analysis, an output of theories of
family and an input of the inequality analysis. The purpose of the present section is to recover
the relevant classes of sharing functions when the allocation of income within the household is
described through a bargaining model. The price of the good is normalized to 1, public goods
11and externalities are neglected. Following Kanbur and Haddad [8], we introduce a symmetric
Nash bargaining model.
Assumption 2 Household behavior is described by the following program
max
x1,x2
(u(x1) − ¯ u1)(u(x2) − ¯ u2) (7)
s.t. x1 + x2 = y.
If the individuals share the same utility function, they are diﬀerentiated by their threats
points ¯ u1 and ¯ u2 (we denote the utility pair (¯ u1, ¯ u2)=¯ u). Then, the solution of (7), x∗
1(y,¯ u),
represents the sharing function fp as a function of the household income and of the threats
points.
Our aim is to clarify how the intra-household diﬀerent bargaining power interacts with
individual attitude towards risk in order to generate the properties of the sharing function.
The tools of the risk theory we use are the well-known Pratt [13] coeﬃcients. We designate
by R(x)=−u00(x)/u0(x) the absolute risk-aversion coeﬃcient and by r(x)=−xu00(x)/u0(x)
the relative risk-aversion coeﬃcient. We assume that u belongs to be the class of (strictly)
increasing and strictly concave Bernoulli utility functions two times diﬀerentiable.
4.1 DARA utility functions and moving away sharing rule
A marginal rise in the household income increases more the expenditure of the dominant indi-
vidual if and only if individuals have a non-decreasing absolute risk aversion (utility belongs to
the DARA class). In other terms, in the set-up of our bargaining model, DARA utility functions
generate moving away sharing functions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that a household follows Assumption 2 and that x∗
1(y,¯ u) is twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable.
Then x∗
1(y,¯ u) ∈ MA for all ¯ u1 ≤ ¯ u2 ⇐⇒ u ∈ DARA.







1) − ¯ u1
u(x∗
2) − ¯ u2
. (8)
This guarantees that, if ¯ u1 < ¯ u2, then x∗
1 <x ∗
2. By diﬀerentiating the f.o.c. of (7) with respect


































1) − ¯ u1)u00(x∗
2) ≥ (u(x∗
2) − ¯ u2)u00(x∗
1).
Using (8), we conclude:
∂x∗
1












This equivalence is suﬃcient to show the suﬃciency part. By considering all ¯ u such that
¯ u1 ≤ ¯ u2, the necessity part is also implied.
4.2 DRRA utility functions and progressive sharing rule
We now establish a relation between star shaped at ∞ sharing functions and individual utility
with decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA class).
Proposition 5 Suppose that a household follows Assumption 2 and that x∗
1(y,¯ u) is twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable.
x∗
1(y,¯ u) ∈ S∞ for all ¯ u1 ≤ ¯ u2 ⇔ u ∈ DRRA.
13Proof. Ad i ﬀerentiable star-shaped at ∞ is characterized by
∂x∗
1
∂y (y,¯ u) ≤
x∗
1(y,¯ u)
y . From (9), it
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1,which is precisely the requirement of DRRA. By considering all ¯ u
such that ¯ u1 ≤ ¯ u2, the necessity part is proved.
In order to show the suﬃciency of DRRA, we start from Ax∗
2 ≥ Bx∗







































, which can be written, using



































1) and therefore implies (10).
The interpretation of these results is quite intuitive: in a bargaining problem, players know
that negotiations may randomly break down. Consequently, a more risk-averse agent may in
general accept a solution which advantages the other player (see Roth and Rothblum [15] for a
rigorous treatment). Since here risk aversion decreases with income, the dominated individual
is also the more (locally) risk-averse. Then he asks for a larger share of the cake in case of low
levels of income, by accepting a lower part of income (in absolute or relative terms) when the
state of the world is more favorable.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we study the eﬀectiveness of redistributive schemes to reduce inequality at the in-
dividual level, when they are performed at the household level. Combining the results presented
in Section 3, a little more complex picture emerges than one would expect, even if the bottom
line is that a positive correlation between within-inequality and household income enforces the
redistributive eﬀects of taxation. Three properties capturing the idea that the more wealthy the
14household is, the more unequally it behaves, have been shown to matter. In the moving away
approach, the deviation with the equal split make a diﬀerence, in the star-shaped approach, the
average share counts while the marginal share is relevant for concavity. When general redistribu-
tion schemes mixing taxes and beneﬁts are considered, the concavity property is needed. When
we focus the attention on simple taxation schemes such as a poll tax or a ﬂat tax, the moving
away and star-shaped functions prove to be the relevant ones. If we move to the pure-beneﬁt
side of the redistribution, the view-point is completely reversed: the more wealthy the household
is, the more equally it must behave. If the empirical evidence brings some support to this last
statement, the policy-maker will have no choice but to target beneﬁts at the individual level
to make his redistribution policy eﬀective. More generally, the policy-maker should analyze the
link between intra-household inequality and household wealth in order to know for which kind
of taxation scheme (taxation or beneﬁt) the individual level proves to be the unescapable level
of design of the policy. A diﬀerent application of our result is suggested by Ravallion (2001) and
Dollar and Kraay (2002). Among others, they ﬁnd that growth tends to be distribution neutral
in relative terms. Then, under star-shaped at 0 sharing functions, the idea of a pro-poor growth
could be strengthened. This suggests a further exploration of poverty among individuals.
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